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INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (H1N1) 2009, ANIMAL (19): ICELAND SWINE, OIE
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A ProMED-mail post
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International Society for Infectious Diseases
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[1]
Date: Tue 27 Oct 2009
Source: OIE's Weekly Disease Information Vol. 22 - No. 44 [edited]
<http://www.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=8594>
Information received on 27 Oct 2009 from Mr Halldor Runolfsson, Chief
Veterinary Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Authority
of Iceland, Selfoss, Iceland
Summary
Report type: Immediate notification
Start date: 24 Oct 2009
Date of 1st confirmation of the event: 27 Oct 2009
Report date: 27 Oct 2009
Date submitted to OIE: 27 Oct 2009
Reason for notification: Emerging disease
Morbidity: 10 percent
Mortality: 0 percent
Zoonotic impact: Possible transmission of the influenza virus between
humans and pigs
Causal agent: Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus
Serotype: Other
This event pertains to the whole country
New outbreaks
Summary of outbreaks
Total outbreaks: 1
Location(s) : GULLBRINGU (Minni-Vatnsleysa, Vogar)
Total animals affected
Species / Susceptible / Cases / Deaths / Destroyed / Slaughtered
Swine / 4500 / 10 / 0 / 0 / 0
Epidemiology
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection: Possible
transmission from human to pigs
Epidemiological comments: Clinical signs commenced on 24 Oct 2009
with 10 sows off feed, temperature greater than 40 C, some were
coughing, and 2 aborted. Two workers had had flu-like symptoms for a
few days prior to the clinical signs in the pigs.
Control measures
Measures applied: Quarantine, Movement control inside the country,
Vaccination prohibited [see comment] , No treatment of affected
animals
Measures to be applied: No other measures
Diagnostic test results
Laboratory name and type: Institute for Experimental Pathology at
Keldur, Iceland (National laboratory)
Tests and results
Species / Test / Test date / Result
Swine / reverse transcription - polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) /
27 Oct 2009 / Positive
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org>
[Iceland is the 10th country reporting infection of pigs, in
commercial farms, with the influenza pandemic A/H1N1 virus. The
previous countries were Canada, Argentina, Australia, Singapore, UK
(Northern Ireland), Ireland, Norway, USA and Japan. In all incidents,
humans were suspected to be the source of infection. The clinical
signs, in all cases, were rather mild. Though swine influenza is not
included in OIE's list of reportable diseases, these outbreaks were
reported as "emerging disease."
Infections have also been seen in turkeys, reported from Chile and
Canada; see posting 20091027.3719 and item 2 further. As in the
outbreaks in pigs, humans were suspected to be the source of
infection. The clinical signs in turkeys were reminiscent of those
seen in cases of low-pathogenic avian influenza, main losses caused
by a significant drop of egg production.
The term "vaccination prohibited" included among the control measures
may be confusing at times. This phrase is used in the OIE
questionnaire when vaccination is not applied, apparently
disregarding the reason. - Mod.AS]
******
[2]
Date: Tue 28 Oct 2009
From: Dave Halvorson <halvo002@umn.edu>
The prohibition of vaccine use [see comment to item 1 above] begs
further commentary.
What is a farmer to do to protect his breeder turkeys effectively
from a human virus? If government regulators have the answer to that
question, they should provide it. If public health personnel cannot
prevent the spread of novel H1N1 from person to person, then it is
unlikely that veterinarians can devise strategies to prevent human to
animal transmission. Biosecurity cannot protect turkeys from people
who are incubating or sick due to novel H1N1.
The economics of producing turkey hatching eggs involves hens valued
at USD 40-50 at the parent flock level. Influenza largely stops all
egg production, which means this hen now becomes worth next to
nothing. So 5000 turkeys lose up to USD 250 000 in value almost
overnight.
--
David A. Halvorson, DVM
Diplomate, ACPV
Professor Emeritus
College Of Veterinary Medicine
University of Minnesota
Saint Paul, Minnesota 55108
<halvo002@umn.edu>
[The situation described by Dr Halvorson resembles the scenario of
non highly pathogenic avian influenza in turkeys; it remains to be
seen whether an inactivated novel/pandemic H1N1 animal vaccine, when
becoming commercially available, would be allowed. As indicated in
OIE's Manual, since the 1970s in the USA, there has been some use of
inactivated vaccines produced under special license on a commercial
basis. These vaccines have been used primarily in turkeys against
viruses that are not highly pathogenic but that may cause severe
clinical signs, especially in exacerbating circumstances. Significant
quantities of this vaccine have been used. In recent years in the
USA, most of the special license inactivated vaccine has been used in
breeder turkeys to protect against H1 and H3 swine influenza viruses.
Conventional vaccination against the prevailing strain of LPAI has
also been used in Italy for a number of years. Vaccination against
H9N2 infections has been used in Pakistan, Iran, China, as well as
several countries in the Middle East. - Mod.AS]
[see also:
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (18): Canada (ON) avian, OIE
20091027.3719
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (17): Japan (OS) swine, OIE
20091022.3635
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (16): Canada (ON) avian 20091022.3629
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (15): USA (OR) ferret
20091021.3618
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (14): Canada (ON),
avian 20091020.3602
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (13): USA swine, conf. 20091020.3600
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (12): USA swine, susp 20091019.3592
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (11): Norway 20091019.3589
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (10): Ireland 20091002.3427
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (09): UK (NI) swine, OIE 20090918.3280
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (08): Singapore, swine
20090904.3114
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (07): Chile, avian 20090829.3036
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (06): Canada, swine 20090828.3027
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (05): Austr., swine 20090826.2999
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (04): Chile, avian, OIE
20090823.2978
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (03): Chile, avian, RFI
20090821.2961
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (02): Austr., swine 20090820.2951
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health: Canada (QC) 20090729.2661
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (17), Argentina, OIE 20090703.2401
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (16), Argentina, swine, OIE 20090626.2322
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (15), Egypt, pig cull 20090617.2241
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (14), EU preparedness, Egypt 20090615.2220
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (13) swine, Canada, origin, RFI 20090615.2215
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (12) swine trial inf. 20090605.2088
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (11) swine trial inf. 20090604.2067
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (10) swine, Canada, cull 20090514.1813
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (09), swine, Canada 20090513.1790
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (08), food safety, FAO/OIE/WHO 20090507.1710
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (07), swine, Canada, OIE 20090506.1691
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (06), Canada, OIE 20090505.1683
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (05), swine, Canada, FAO 20090505.1680
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (04), infected swine, Canada 20090502.1653
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (03), Egypt, pig cull 20090502.1649
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health 20090430.1637
Influenza A (H1N1), "swine flu": animal health (02), Egypt,
prevention 20090429.1623
Influenza A (H1N1), "swine flu": animal health 20090428.1604]
...............................................arn/msp/lm
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